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ESSAY

Review of the History of the April 1997 Trade
and Commerce Agreement Among the
Traditional Haudenosaunee Councils of
Chiefs and New York State and the Impact
Thereof on Haudenosaunee Sovereignty
JOSEPH J. HEATH, ESQ.t
INTRODUCTION

The first six months of 1997 were an eventful and
important part of the history of New York State's attempts
to collect sales and excise taxes on the sales of tobacco
t General Counsel to the Onondaga Nation, the central fire keeper of the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. During the negotiations with New York State
during 1996 and the first half of 1997, I was the only attorney on the
Haudenosaunee side of the table and I represented all of the Traditional
Councils of Chiefs in the talks which resulted in this proposed Trade and
Commerce Agreement. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse
University, 1982; Adjunct Professor, SUNY at Oswego, 1982-1983. A.B.,
Syracuse University, 1968; J.D., SUNY at Buffalo, 1974.
This Essay was originally presented as a speech on March 21, 1998, at the
Symposium on Law, Sovereignty and Tribal Governance: The Iroquois Confederacy sponsored by the Buffalo Law Review. The views expressed herein are the
personal views of the author and do not represent in any way official positions
of the Onondaga Nation. In addition, I take full responsibility for all
unsupported assertions in this Essay, as they are based on my personal
observations. I would like to thank the editors of the Buffalo Law Review for
their invitation to speak at their symposium and for their offer to publish this
Essay.
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products and gasoline on the territories of the various

Indian' nations within New York's boundaries. This
struggle was created by the conflict between the
Haudenosaunee2 and New York State. The Haudenosaunee
claim that New York's laws, particularly its tax laws, do not
apply on their territories because the Haudenosaunee are
aboriginal sovereign governments, while New York State
claims that 25 U.S.C. § 233 and various United States
Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions authorize
the collection of state taxes on sales of products to nonnative buyers even when such sales occur on
Haudenosaunee territories.3
This long conflict came to a head on February 12, 1996.
Through a letter from the Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance to the leaders of the native nations, New York
State announced that in sixty days the state would begin to
collect certain excise and sales taxes on all sales to nonnatives unless the native governments negotiated and

1. There is no correct English word to collectively describe the indigenous
people of what is now New York State. Indian is a noun or adjective which
relates back to the fact that Columbus thought that he had "discovered" India
when his ships landed in the Western Hemisphere. This Essay will use the
terms Indian, native and indigenous interchangeably. The more substantive
terms nation and people will be used collectively in their international law
sense, rather than the pejorative term tribe.
2. "Haudenosaunee" is the English translation of the term used by the
native peoples themselves to collectively describe the Iroquois Confederacy.
"Haudenosaunee" roughly translates to mean the people of the Longhouse. The
English, and later the Americans, referred to the Haudenosaunee as the "Six
Nations" or the "Six Nation Confederacy." The French referred to the
Haudenosaunee as the "Iroquois." In the past 25 years, as they have struggled
to reaffirm their sovereign status, the Haudenosaunee have endeavored to
reject these colonial or imperialist terms and strongly prefer to be called the
Haudenosaunee.
The Haudenosaunee consists of the traditional governments of the Mohawk,
Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Tuscarora nations. Each of these
nations has preserved their aboriginal clan and nations systems of government
with varying degrees of success. The Haudenosaunee Grand Council consists of
the fifty (50) Chiefs of the six Haudenosaunee nations, who still meet and
governs the collective affairs of the confederacy, while each Haudenosaunee
nation still governs it own internal affairs. Each Haudenosaunee nation has
preserved and still speaks its native languages and conducts its government as
was done before European imperial intervention. Further, the Haudenosaunee
religion, which is shared by all six nations, has been preserved and is still
actively practiced in the Longhouses.
3. See New York Assoc. of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904
(N.Y. 1998) (discussing New York's position).
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signed written agreements with the state providing for
some other arrangement. The various responses to this
state-created ultimatum among the native peoples within
New York's borders, as well as some of the historical events
of the Spring of 1997, will be reviewed in this Essay.
The Haudenosaunee entered into extensive and
intensive negotiations with state representatives and
eventually reached a tentative agreement. An interim
agreement was implemented on April 1, 1997. As negotiations continued, the interim agreement was extended
into May, and a proposed "final" agreement was reached in
early May 1997. On May 22, 1997, with approval of the
Haudenosaunee Grand Council still pending, New York
Governor George Pataki unilaterally, and without notice,
canceled these agreements and announced that New York
would suspend its efforts at collecting these taxes on any
sales on native territories.4
When the Haudenosaunee evaluated the governor's
February 12 ultimatum, they decided that they should
attempt to resolve this potentially explosive conflict
through the Haudenosaunee's historic process of diplomatic
government-to-government negotiations. Before entering
these negotiations, the Haudenosaunee set certain
fundamental principles in the Trade and Commerce
Agreements and adhered to them throughout the
negotiations.
The first principle sought preservation of the
Haudenosaunee nations' sovereignty and the recognition of
this sovereignty by the State of New York. The second
principle called for the state to recognize that this
sovereignty afforded each nation the right to control and
regulate all trade and commerce on its territory. The third
principle stressed that no state tax could be collected from
any sale to any person when that sale took place on
Haudenosaunee territory. The final principle called for
preservation of the economic base that native retail stores
provided for the nations. All four principles were fully
embodied and preserved in the Trade and Commerce
Agreements reached with the state.
The Haudenosaunee has never consented to the
4. See Robert L. Smith, Governor Pulls Plug on Indian Tax Collections:
Standoffs End Stuns All Sides: A State Agreement With the Iroquois is
Suddenly Cancelled,POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), May 23, 1997, at Al.
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jurisdictional authority of New York State, and has never
agreed to allow New York State to impose its laws,
including its tax laws, upon the Haudenosaunee people or
on any transactions conducted within the territorial
boundaries of its member nations.
The interim and proposed final Trade and Commerce
Agreements contained these major provisions:
No state taxes, either excise or sales, would be collected
on any sales of cigarettes and/or tobacco products which
occurred on Haudenosaunee territories;
The state re-affirmed its recognition of the sovereignty
of the Haudenosaunee and its member nations; and
The state affirmed its recognition that one aspect of the
sovereignty of the Haudenosaunee nations was their
governments' rights to control and regulate all trade and
commerce within their territories.
As a corollary, all stores on Haudenosaunee territories
were to be licensed by their native governments and to pay
the nation government a nation cigarette fee. The fees
varied but were generally less than half of what the state
taxes were. This fee arrangement still left native stores at a
remarkably competitive advantage over non-native stores,
as non-native stores had to pay state taxes. Under the
interim agreement, Haudenosaunee stores could sell
cartons of cigarettes for about four dollars less than their
non-native competitors, a difference of approximately twenty percent.
The interim and final agreements represented a winwin situation for both the nations and the individual native
store owners. The nations would have a steady source of
revenue to fund their governmental operations and social
programs. The businesses could continue to make steady
and healthy profits on these tax-exempt sales-sales whose
tax-exempt status was secured by the nations' sovereignty.
Further, the agreements would end uncertainties regarding
whether native stores could continue their competitive taxexempt status. For over ten years prior to the trade and
commerce agreements, native stores and the nations'
economies lived under a cloud of uncertainty concerning
when and how the state would impose its taxes on their
stores' sales. The proposed agreements would remove this
cloud.
Recognizing these benefits, one wonders why the native
store owners and their supporters vehemently opposed the
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trade and commerce agreements. From the Haudenosaunee
perspective, the answer was clear. The owners' greed and
desire for maximum individual profits strongly outweighed
any concern the store owners had for the sovereignty of
their own traditional governments. These owners refused to
recognize that all Haudenosaunee citizens should share in
the benefits of the stores' tax-exempt sales.
This Essay will explore the general provisions and some
of the details of the tax and commerce agreements, the
business owners' responses to the proposed agreements and
the state court cases which resulted. Part I of this Essay
will review the history prior to 1997 which set the
framework for these negotiations. Part II will review the
1996 and 1997 negotiations between the Haudenosaunee
and New York and the provisions of the interim and final
Trade and Commerce Agreements. Part III of this Essay
will review two of the responses by native business owners
to the interim and final Trade and Commerce Agreements.
Part III will also discuss some of the state court cases of
April and May of 1997 which attempted to halt the state's
implementation of its taxing structure. Finally, Part III will
review the impact of all of these events on the Haudenosaunee's continued struggle to preserve its sovereignty and
its sovereign right to govern its own territory.
I.

THE HISTORY LEADING TO THE 1997 TRADE AND
COMMERCE AGREEMENTS

A. Background and General State Taxation Scheme
New York State imposes an excise tax on cigarettes,
tobacco products and motor fuel that are imported,
manufactured or sold in the state.5 State and local governments also impose a sales tax on cigarettes and motor fuel
that are imported, manufactured or sold in the state.6 Prior
to 1985, these taxes were collected when the products were
sold for the first time by a distributor or a nondistributor.
This taxing scheme left open at least two major
loopholes. The New York State Department of Taxation and
Finance (hereinafter the Tax Department) claimed that the
5. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 284, 471,471-c (McKinney 1998).
6. See N.Y. TAxLAw §§ 1102, 1103 (McKinney 1998).
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loopholes resulted in millions of dollars of uncollected excise

and sales taxes. The first loophole allowed distributors to
sell these aforementioned products to native stores and gas
stations without collecting the state taxes. The second
loophole emanated from the fact that transfers between
distributors were tax-free. Some distributors transferred
the same products among themselves several times in one
day by merely noting the transfer on paper. Distributors
frequently engaged in "daisy-chain" schemes,7 concealing
certain transfers, transferring products to insolvent or
nonexistent parties or falsely reporting that the taxes had
been paid. The Tax Department claimed a documented
annual loss of $90 million from the evasion of the excise and
sales taxes. Industry experts estimated that the combined
state and local revenue loss could have been as high as $200
million.8 It is important to note, however, that the
Haudenosaunee has always felt that the state and the
lobbyists for convenience store and gas stations owners
inflated these losses.
B. The 1985 and 1986 Tax Law and Regulations
Amendments
In an effort to end the alleged revenue losses, the New
York State Legislature enacted a new enforcement
procedure which went into effect on June 1, 1985.' Under
this new procedure, excise and sales taxes would be
collected upon the initial importation, sale or delivery of
these products to the state-registered dealers. This new
enforcement procedure was designed to eliminate the taxfree transfers between distributors and to terminate the
availability of untaxed products for native stores and stations. Additionally, the Legislature established a registration process for distributors with strict standards requiring
store owners to file a security bond or other acceptable
securitV to cover their liability for the excise and sales
taxes.'
The ultimate tax burden remained with the consumer.
7. See Motor Fuel Taxes, Memorandum of State Executive Department,
1985 N.Y. Laws 2959.
8. Id. at 2955.
9. Id. at 2960.
10. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 283 (McKinney 1998).
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Distributors were authorized to shift the tax burden to their
transferees, and the final seller was required to collect a tax
based on the actual selling price and to pay the net tax due
or to claim a credit for any difference between the amount
of tax collected and the tax paid on the sale to the first
registered distributor."
This new tax-collecting scheme resulted in the requirement that all native store and station owners collect
state excise and sales taxes for all sales. Since these taxes
had already been imposed on the distributor, there would
be no legal source of tax-free products for native stores. Had
this taxing scheme been fully implemented, native stores
would have been faced with the dilemma of either selling at
a fully-taxed final price and somehow absorbing the full
amount of the excise and sales taxes in order to continue to
sell at a non-taxed price or obtaining "contraband" product
upon which the state taxes had not yet been collected.
Because sales to natives were still supposed to be taxexempt, a mechanism was created whereby the native
stores could apply to the state for a refund of all state taxes
for sales to "qualified Indian consumers." 2 However, this
required elaborate bookkeeping and the use of coupons, and
such sales would have been limited by a state-set quota."
Further, the definition of "qualified Indian consumers" was
much too narrow from the native perspective.' 4
Additionally, in the following year the New York State
Legislature authorized physical seizure and forfeiture as
part of the enforcement scheme to curb the evasion of excise
and sales taxes, 5 and required the operator of every motor
vehicle transporting motor fuel within the state to maintain
a manifest indicating, inter alia, the name and address of
every person to whom the fuel is delivered, the place of the
delivery and, if the fuel is imported into the state, the name
of the distributor importing the fuel. 6 The same seizure
provisions and manifest requirements had been created for
11. See Motor Fuels Taxes, Memorandum of State Executive Dep't, 1985
N.Y. Laws 2960.
12. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, §§ 336.6(a), 336.7(e) (repealed
1998).
13. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 336.7(c) (repealed 1998).
14. See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20. § 336.6(b)(1)(ii) (defining
qualified Indian consumer).
15. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1848 (McKinney 1998).
16. N.Y. TAX LAW § 286-b(1) (McKinney 1998).
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cigarettes and tobacco products in the previous year.'
In recognition of the controversy surrounding the
state's attempts to collect its taxes on sales in Indian
territory, the 1986 regulations created an "opting out"
provision, under which an Indian nation could enter into an
agreement with the state "to regulate, license or control the
sale and distribution" of cigarettes on its territory and
thereby circumvent this taxing scheme. 8 Many other states
have similar opting out agreements, and the practice in
those states had been for the Indian nations to collect a
mutually agreed-upon percentage of the state excise tax
and turn these tax revenues over to the state. The Cuomo
administration had a similar formula in mind when it
included the opting out agreement provision in the 1986
changes.
In order to fully understand the excise tax struggles
since 1986, and the events of 1997 in particular, it is
important to comprehend the effects which would have
resulted if the Attea regulations had been implemented.
First, there would have been no legal supply of untaxed
cigarettes or motor fuel available to native retailers. The
excise and sales taxes would have been fully paid on all
legal products reaching these native retailers. Second, if
they complied with the elaborate bookkeeping, quota and
coupon requirements, the retailers could have applied to
the state for a refund of state taxes which had been precollected on products sold to qualified Indian consumers.
Third, all Indian motor fuel retailers would have been
required to be licensed by the state and to fully comply with
the state tax laws and regulations. 9 This scenario could
have been avoided only if the native government reached an
opting out agreement with the state.
Once it understood its options under the proposed Attea
regulations, the Haudenosaunee decided that the most
responsible course of action to fight this imposition of state
jurisdiction and taxes was to engage in diplomatic, gov17. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1846-47 (McKinney 1998). Through out the remainder
of this Essay, I will refer to these regulations as the Attea regulations, because
these were the regulations which were challenged by Milhelm Attea &
Brothers, Inc. in a series of state court rulings and then finally in the United

States Supreme Court. This litigation is discussed in the next section.
18. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 336.7(g) (repealed 1998).

19. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, §§ 414.6(b)(4), 414.7 (repealed
1998).
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ernment-to-government negotiations with the state. Court
challenges were evaluated and rejected as a means of
preventing implementation of the state tax and regulatory
scheme because the history of state and federal courts in
this area was solidly against the natives and fully in favor
of absolute recognition of the state's right to impose its laws
and taxes on these sales. The Haudenosaunee determined
that a court challenge might negatively impact national
sovereignty.
C. The History and Impact of the Attea Court Challenges
While the long-term chances of success of litigation to
challenge this taxing scheme were very slim, the short-term
benefits of such litigation for non-native cigarette
distributors were very profitable. The costs of litigation,
while substantial, constituted a mere fraction of the profits
that could be preserved by preventing implementation of
the 1985 and 1986 regulatory changes. This phenomenon
was exemplified in the now well-known Attea litigation.
Milhelm Attea and Brothers, Inc. is a cigarette
distributor located near Buffalo, New York who sells at
least seventy-five percent of all of its cigarette sales to
retailers on Indian nations." In 1989, Attea brought an
action in state Supreme Court challenging its new taxing
and enforcement scheme, by seeking to enjoin enforcement
of the tax regulations concerning cigarettes sold on native
territories.2 The Appellate Division, Third Department
affirmed a lower court decision granting an injunction.22
The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the state's
appeal of the Appellate Division's affirmation." On further
appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and remanded the case to New York State's Appellate
20. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. N.Y. Dep't of Tax. and Fin., 564 N.Y.S.2d
491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
21. The Haudenosaunee reject the use of the term "reservations" to describe
their aboriginal territories. This is because they were never conquered and
herded onto land designated for their use by non-natives. For instance the
Onondaga Nation territory south of Syracuse has always been fully controlled
and "owned" by the Onondagas; it was never reserved for their use. It has never
been under the jurisdiction of the state of federal governments, and it is not
held in trust for them.
22. Attea, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
23. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. N.Y. Dep't of Tax & Fin., 575 N.E.2d 400
(N.Y. 1991).
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Division.24 On remand, the Third Department reversed its
earlier ruling, holding that the original injunction was not
proper.25 Attea appealed to the New York State Court of
Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division decision
and re-instated the injunction against the tax regulations."
Thereafter, the state appealed this ruling by its highest
court prohibiting the implementation of these regulations
and its scheme to collect its excise taxes on sales of
cigarettes on native territories. The United States Supreme
Court again granted certiorari.27 This long "roller coaster
ride" of litigation finally ended on June 13, 1994, when the
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, held: (1) the federal statute conferring on the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs the authority to make rules
and regulations with respect to the sale of goods to Indians
on reservations did not preempt state regulation that was
reasonably necessary to the collection of lawful state taxes;
(2) the scheme under which a quota was imposed on the
number of tax-exempt cigarettes that wholesalers could sell
for resale on reservations to qualified Indian consumers and
record keeping requirements were established did not
impose an excessive burden on Indian traders or retailers;
and (3) the requirement that retailers obtain state tax
exemption certificates (coupons) did not impose an
excessive burden on Indian traders or retailers.28 In so
holding the Supreme Court categorically stated:
"[R]eservation sales to persons other than reservation
Indians, however, are legitimately subject to state
taxation." This ruling was not unexpected, given earlier
Supreme Court decisions which recognized other states'
rights to tax sales to non-natives.' °
24. New York Dep't of Tax. and Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 502 U.S.
1053 (1992).
25. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. N.Y. Dep't of Tax & Fin., 585 N.Y.S.2d
847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
26. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. N.Y. Dep't of Tax & Fin., 615 N.E.2d 994,
999 (N.Y. 1993).
27. New York Dep't of Tax & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 510 U.S.
943 (1993).
28. New York Dep't of Tax & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S.
61 (1994).
29. Id. at 64.
30. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead, 425 U.S.
463 (1976); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v.
Washington, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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At least two aspects of the Attea litigation should be
stressed here. First, although Attea eventually lost in the
Supreme Court, the company managed to delay the
implementation of the New York State regulations and
taxing scheme for over five years. This enabled Attea to
continue to do business and make substantial profits. For
this non-native cigarette distributor, the profits it enjoyed
for that five year period were probably much more
important than the eventual ruling which imposed state
jurisdiction and taxes on native territories within New
York. As it turns out, at the time of the writing of this
essay, more than four years after the Supreme Court
decision, the taxing scheme had not yet been implemented
by the state, despite the Pataki administration's substantial
efforts to do so in 1997. These efforts, though abruptly
abandoned, will be reviewed below.
Second, none of the Indian nations within New York's
boundaries actively participated in the Attea litigation."'
Many natives believe that the result would have been
different if an Indian nation had participated, but most
lawyers and legal scholars familiar with these issues do not
believe that would have substantially affected the outcome.
D. The Aftermath of Attea and the Events Leading Up To
1997
With such a clear ruling by the Supreme Court, it was
the common knowledge in 1994 that the end of the era of
tax-free cigarette sales by Indian retailers may be just
around the corner. However, 1994 was a gubernatorial
election year, and Governor Mario Cuomo was not about to
enter the mine field by attempting to collect state excise
taxes for sales on native territories at least until after the
November election. Negotiations ensued between the
Haudenosaunee and the Cuomo administration during the
Summer and Fall of 1994, but it soon became evident that
the State was only willing to proceed with the negotiations
in a very slow manner, and no real results would be
31. The Seneca Nation filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Attea in the
Supreme Court. This brief argued that New York State's cigarette tax laws and
regulations violated the treaty the Seneca Nation had with the United States
insofar as the regulations allowed New York to tax any transaction occurring on
Seneca Nation territory. This argument was not addressed by the Supreme
Court. See Attea, 512 U.S. at 77 n.11.
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achieved until after the election.
Within one week of the election, the Haudenosaunee
started their official and unofficial attempts to meet with
Governor-elect Pataki and his transition team. These
unsuccessful attempts were renewed in January 1995, after
Pataki's inauguration. Despite letters from the Haudenosaunee to the Pataki administration requesting a meeting
to discuss a wide variety of issues in need of resolution, no
such meeting occurred until early February 1996.
II. THE 1996 AND 1997 NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROPOSED
TRADE AND COMMERCE AGREEMENTS

A. The Governmental Complexity of New York's Indian
Nations in the Spring of 1997
Although there are traditional governments for each of
the six member nations of the Haudenosaunee (Mohawk,
Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Tuscarora), only
four of these nations (Onondaga, Cayuga, Tonawanda
Seneca and Tuscarora) are currently recognized by the
federal government. New York State followed the lead of
the federal government officially recognizing only those
same four traditional governments.
1. The Mohawk Nation. The elected Saint Regis
government in the Mohawk Nation is a system of three
chiefs created by state law. 2 However, the actual governmental structure of the Mohawk territory at Akwesasne is
much more complicated. A large part of this complexity is
created by the fact that the geographic territory of
Akwesasne lies on both sides of the United States and
Canadian border, with the St. Lawrence River generally
being recognized by non-natives as the international border.
The state-created elected government receives massive
amounts of federal money from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.33
In the past ten years this elected government has
32. See N.Y. INDIAN LAW §§ 100-14 (McKinney 1998).
33. No traditional Haudenosaunee government accepts one cent of federal
funds from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This would violate their fimdamental
belief that they are separate, pre-existing sovereign governments.
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repeatedly been at the center of controversy, due in part to
numerous allegations of corruption. The most recent
evidence of this corruption was in 1997 when a fifty-four
page criminal indictment was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York.
Twenty-one people were indicted for over $687 million in
alleged smuggling over the St. Lawrence border.34 One of
the specific allegations in this indictment was that one of
the former elected chiefs, L. David Jacobs, had used his
official position to promote these smuggling operations, had
received bribes for this assistance and promotion and had
run the elected government as a criminal racketeering
enterprise through a pattern of bribery and extortion.
When considered along with earlier allegations that the
elected government had been complicit in illegal gaming
operations in the late 1980s and the tragic deaths of the two
Mohawks by gunfire during armed activities of the warriors
in 1990, these events led to the repeated introduction of
bills in the New York State legislature to repeal Article 836
and the dissolution of the elected government.
On October 6, 1998, former elected chief L. David
Jacobs entered a plea of guilty in district court. Jacobs
admitted that, while chief, he conducted the elected St.
Regis government as a criminal racketeering enterprise. In
addition, Jacobs admitted that he received substantial
bribes in the late 1980s from a convicted gambler in order
to protect Jacobs' illegal gambling casino and that he took
bribes 37from three other gambling operatives in the early
1990s.
The governmental picture at Akwesasne is further
complicated by the existence of another elected government
on the Canadian side of the territory and the existence of
the traditional Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs, a
governing body recognized and followed by Mohawk People

34. See John O'Brien, Feds Crack $687 Million Border Smuggling Ring:
Twenty-One People are ChargedWith Conspiringto Defraud U.S. and Canadian
Governments: "This is Bigger than Al Capone," said Agent, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), June 24, 1997, at Al.
35. Id.
36. See A-708, 220th N.Y. Leg. Sess. (1997).
37. See John O'Brien, Ex-Chief Admits Bribery, Extortion, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), Oct. 7, 1998, at B2 ("L. David Jacobs, a chief at Akwesasne from
1988 to 1994, pleaded guilty last week in U.S. District Court to conducting the
tribe's affairs through a pattern of racketeering.").

1024

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

on both sides of the international border. In the Mohawk
land claim, all three governments are parties and all three
have actively participated in the litigation and negotiations.
Since cigarette and gas businesses generate millions of
dollars in revenue, their influence on tribal elections under
the elected systems can be pervasive. When only a few
hundred or a few thousand votes are cast in such elections,
money has been the dominant factor. This phenomenon has
prevented elected governments from being able to control or
regulate their businesses. Business-dominated governments
led the state-created elected Mohawk and Seneca governments to fight hard against resolution of long-standing tax
dispute in the Spring of 1997.
2. The Seneca Nation. In 1848, the state attempted to
replace the traditional Seneca government with an elected
one. However, the traditional Seneca government was
preserved on the Tonawanda Seneca territory, and it still
exists today in its ancient form. This traditional government is recognized by both the state and federal
governments. The state-created elected Seneca government
is also federally recognized as governing the larger
Cattaraugus and Allegany territories. Many traditional
Senecas live on these territories. This elected Seneca
government consists of a president who is elected for a two
year term, with a one term limit; a tribal council, whose
members are also elected on a rotating basis; and a
judiciary, known as the Seneca Peacemakers Court.38
This elected Seneca government has been at the center
of controversy in the recent past. In 1994, an internal
dispute between the President and the business-dominated
Tribal Council led to the filing of a lawsuit in state Supreme
Court by the lawyer for the Seneca Nation, acting on the
direction of the Tribal Council. The Tribunal Council sought
an injunction to challenge the actions of the then president,
Dennis Bowen and the decisions of the Seneca Peacemakers Court.3 After the state court issued the injunction,
based upon the state court's assertion that it had proper
jurisdiction to intervene in the internal governmental
decisions of the elected Seneca government, President
Bowen filed an action in federal court in the Western
38. See N.Y. INDiAN LAw §§ 40-46, 70-74 (McKinney 1998).
39. John v. Bowen, No. 1994/12582 (Erie Co. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 1994).
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District of New York in Buffalo." The federal court
overruled the state court, vacated the injunction and ruled
that state court was without jurisdiction to intervene in
such an internal matter.
This governmental crisis which developed from an early
gambling controversy as well as the controversy over the
control of businesses, had a tragic outcome when in 1995
three Senecas were killed in an attempted armed assault
upon one of the government buildings by pro-gaming
supporters.41 In the 1996 Seneca election, Michael Schindler
was elected president when he ran on an anti-gambling
platform. However, the tribal council has recently
mandated that yet another vote be taken on the issue of
gaming in the Seneca Nation.
3. The Oneida Nation. The Oneida Nation of New York
has developed a hybrid government which is neither
traditional nor elected. This government is essentially ruled
by one man, Ray Halbritter, the Nation Representative and
the Chief Executive Officer of the Nation's casino and other
businesses. He is supported by a "Men's Council" which his
critics say is hand-picked, merely a rubber stamp to his
ultimate rulings. The traditional people of Oneida unsuccessfully challenged Halbritter's hybrid government in
the Northern District of New York.42 The District Court's
dismissal of this challenge was affirmed by the Second
Circuit.43

This governmental picture seems complex because it is.
When the State set unrealistically short deadlines in the
Spring of 1996 it compounded difficulties already in
existence within the nations. A further complication was
created by the state's insistence that all negotiations towards any non-tax agreements be kept absolutely secret.
This secrecy was very problematic for the traditional
Haudenosaunee governments because of their tradition of
40. See Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
41. See John Kifner, Tribal Shootout: Rival Factions Behind Conflict, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1995, at B1.
42. See Shenandoah v. Dep't of Interior, No. 96-CV-258(RSP/GJD), 1997 WL
214947 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997).
43. See Shenandoah v. Dep't of Interior, No. 97-6142, 1998 WL 741842 (2d
Cir. Oct. 6, 1998).
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direct democracy in their Longhouses, which mandates that
all major decisions be fully open to all members of their
communities and debated by all interested citizens until
consensus is reached.
From February 1996 to May 1997, the state representatives were engaged in separate negotiations with: (1)
the Haudenosaunee leadership, (2) the elected Mohawk
government, (3) the elected Seneca government, (4) the
Halbritter government and (5) the non-federally recognized
Indian nations of Long Island.
B. The 1996 and 1997 Negotiations
This first meeting between the Haudenosaunee leadership and Governor Pataki administration occurred on
February 10, 1996. I attended this meeting as the only
attorney for the Haudenosaunee. The meeting was cordial,
but very little substance was covered. However, a tentative
agenda of issues such as land claims, taxation, jurisdiction
and hunting and fishing was identified for future work.
Within days of this meeting, on February 12, 1996, the
Pataki administration announced that the Attea regulations, which had been very slightly amended in November 1995, would be implemented with sixty days unless
Indian nations reached agreements to the contrary with the
state within that time frame. This meant that, absent some
action by the native governments, the legal supply of taxfree cigarettes to native retailers would be shut off and all
native retailers would need state-issued licenses and to
collect full state excise and sales taxes for their sales. This
taxing scheme would be backed up by the seizure and
forfeiture provisions mentioned above. 4
Therefore, in February 1996, the Haudenosaunee and
other native governments had to respond to this statecreated deadline and make decisions as to which of the
possible choices of action they should take. The choice
selected by the Haudenosaunee was to peacefully resolve
this jurisdictional and taxation dispute via diplomacy using
face-to-face negotiations with the state officials to determine if an opting out agreement could be reached. The
second possibility of a direct state or federal court challenge
to the state's jurisdiction and taxing scheme was rejected by
44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the Haudenosaunee once evaluated. A third alternative,
that of direct confrontation through road closures or other
means, as occurred on the Cattaraugus and Allegany
Seneca territories, was evaluated and reserved for possible
later use if the negotiations were not successful. A fourth
alternative, not doing anything, was rejected as not responsive to the short- or long-term needs of the Haudenosaunee
people.
Before entering these negotiations, the Haudenosaunee
had invoked Article VII of the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua '
and written to the President of the United States concerning this developing crisis. The response indicated that the
President designated the Office of Tribal Justice of the
United States Justice Department as his representative in
this matter. A meeting was held with Tribal Justice in
Washington, D.C., in the Spring of 1996, and the Haudenosaunee were told that as members of the United States
Justice Department, the Tribal Justice lawyers were bound
by the Supreme Court's decision in Attea that such state
taxation of sales to non-natives was legal. The Tribal
Justice lawyers advised the Haudenosaunee that they
should proceed with their negotiations with the state.
Subsequently, a lawyer from Tribal Justice was present at
most to the Haudenosaunee-state negotiation sessions as a
federal representative.
Throughout these negotiations, the state was represented by two attorneys from the Governor's staff, a lawyer
from the Attorney General's office and two lawyers from the
state Department of Taxation and Finance. From time to
time, other members of the Department of Taxation and
Finance attended the meetings, as their expertise in such
matters as enforcement and cigarette stamping was needed.
These negotiations continued from March 1996 until
May 1997, however, there were many periods when no talks
were held due to other commitments on the part of one side
or the other. On the state side, the predominance of state
budget negotiations was a major cause of delay. In both
1996 and 1997, the state budget was not resolved among
the governor's office, the state Senate and the Assembly
until July, despite the April 1 deadline. Additionally, after
August, the state government essentially shuts down for an
45. See Treaty With the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44 [hereinafter
Treaty of Canandaigua].
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extended period, with lawmakers returning to their home
districts. On the Haudenosaunee side, their traditional
religious ceremonies mandate that they are not able to meet
for extended periods.
However, meetings continued on a somewhat regular
basis. The state-set deadlines were extended several times
due to the good faith bargaining of the Haudenosaunee
leadership. The most intense period of negotiations occurred in the Spring 1997, with at least one meeting every
week and frequent exchanges of written drafts.
Since there is a strong possibility that these negotiations could resume in the near future, given that the tax
issue is not resolved, it does not seem wise to go into too
much detail regarding the positions of either side. It would
be safe to say, however, that the sides were very far apart
at the start of this process. The state was armed with the
Supreme Court Attea decision and, therefore, insisted that
its jurisdiction and "right" to impose its taxes on such sales
was very strong. The Haudenosaunee maintained that their
sovereignty, as recognized by the late eighteenth century
treaties with the federal government, protected them from
any interference from state law or taxes.
When the role of other forces was added to this mix, the
likelihood of ever reaching an agreement seemed even more
remote. On the non-native side, the well organized convenience store and gas station owners exerted great
influence. Their position was, and continues to be, that they
were entitled to a 'level playing field," meaning that all
state taxes must be collected on all sales regardless where
the sales occurred. They introduced the demand that the
governor collect one hundred percent of the state taxes. It
was no secret that these groups and their well-funded
lobbying organizations had been major contributors to the
Pataki election campaign. They were also very vocal in the
media, and they have sued the Pataki administration to
attempt to force the full collection of all state taxes on these
sales on native territory.46
46. See New York Assoc. of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 648 N.Y.S.2d 890
(Albany Co. Sup. Ct. 1996), affd as modified by 658 N.Y.S.2d 468 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997), rev'd 669 N.E.2d 904 (N.Y. 1998) (rejecting the convenience stores'
argument that the Tax Department's policy of failure to enforce the state's tax
laws for on-reservation sales did not constitute a form of race based
discrimination). The Court of Appeals based its decision on a series of Supreme
Court opinions which authorize separate policies for Indians because of their
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On the native side, the individual business owners and
their warrior supporters were adamant that sovereignty
was an individual matter which entitled them to conduct
any business they chose with no regulation or control by
any government, even their own native governments. They
maintained that the state had no right to impose these
taxes (a view fully shared by the Haudenosaunee leadership) and that no talks with the state should take place.
They also became quite organized during this period,
forming an organization known at different times as the
Native American Business League and the First Nation
Business Association. Throughout the period, threats
emanated from the warrior faction that any native leader
who negotiated with the state would be considered a traitor
and dealt with accordingly. In April 1997 the home of Tuscarora traditional Chief Leo Henry was firebombed and
destroyed. A few weeks later, an abandoned house owned
by the family of Onondaga traditional Chief Alson Gibson
was also destroyed by arson. Additionally, many documents
threatened the lives and homes of the traditional chiefs.
Another problematic factor was the media release in
July 1996 that at some early stage of the Pataki
administration a plan entitled "Operation Gallant Piper"
had been explored. It called for the combined use of state
police and National Guard planes, armored personnel
carriers and armed forces to invade the Akwesasne, Onondaga and Seneca territories to quell any resistance to the
imposition of state taxes. While this plan was later
denounced by the Pataki administration, the very fact that
it ever existed was a major cause for alarm.
Against this complex and potentially dangerous
background, the negotiations quietly continued with major
efforts on both sides to work towards resolution.
C. The April 1, 1997 ProposedInterim Trade and
Commerce Agreement
On March 30, 1997, the final details of a proposed
Interim Trade and Commerce Agreement were hammered
unique historical-and "quasi-sovereign" status. See Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979); Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976); U.S. v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
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out. An interim agreement went into effect on April 1,
1997,"7 a final deadline which had been set by the state.
Without any agreement, no tax-exempt cigarettes would
have been available after April 1 for any native retailers.
Further, all native stores would have been required to
obtain a state license. Without an agreement, retailers
would not have been able to continue to sell tax-exempt
products legally. The imposition of state jurisdiction and
tax laws would have trampled on the sovereignty of the
Haudenosaunee nations.
The state was fully prepared to stop all shipments of
product to stores on native territories which were made
without full compliance with its laws. In fact, in April, a
number of these shipments were seized in the western part
of New York State
and forfeiture procedures were instituted
48
in state COUrt.
The major provisions of the Interim Agreement were:
(1) the sovereignty of the Haudenosaunee was recognized
and reaffirmed by the state, (2) the state recognized the
eighteenth century treaties between the Haudenosaunee
and the United States government, (3) the state recognized
the traditional Haudenosaunee governments' right to regulate trade and commerce on its territories, and (4) no state
taxes would be collected on sales of cigarettes at stores on
Haudenosaunee territories.49
The Interim Agreement also provided that all stores on
Haudenosaunee territories would be licensed by their
native governments. This avoided the state's mandate that
all native stores obtain state licenses and fully comply with
all state laws and regulations. Under the Interim Agreement, a minimum sale price was established for cartons of
cigarettes sold at native stores." This minimum price
varied according to the geographic location of the territories with respect to major cities, so that more rural
territories had a lower sale price (inducing non-native
customers to travel farther to reach them). These minimum
prices would be maintained by the use of a nation cigarette

47. See Trade and Commerce Agreement Between the Sate of New York and
the Haudenosauneeand the State ofNew York, DAYBREAK, Apr. 1, 1997, at 11.
48. See infra Section III.C.
49. See Trade and Commerce Agreement Between the Sate of New York and
the Haudenosauneeand the State ofNew York, supra note 47.
50. Id.
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fee which the stores paid to their nation government. When
combined, the minimum price and nation fee still afforded
each store the opportunity to enjoy substantial sales and
profits.
The nation fee remained with the nation and became
general revenue for the native governments. On Onondaga,
the fee is the only revenue source for dozens of social
programs which are funded by the traditional government,
including, but not limited to, language programs, home repair programs, annual heat subsidies for each household,
repairs of community buildings, clean up and landscaping
of the territory and sports programs for all ages.
The Interim Agreement specifically provided that it
would only last thirty days, until such time as a final
agreement could be reached.5 As it turned out, the Interim
Agreement was extended by mutual agreement into May
while final details were negotiated.
From the Haudenosaunee perspective, the period between the Interim Agreement and the final proposal was
used for community review and full discussions. Community review was in process when the Governor unilaterally canceled the Agreement on May 22, 1998.52 During
community review, it was determined that there were some
unacceptable provisions in the Interim Agreement. After
negotiations between the Haudenosaunee and the state in
April and May, the state agreed to amend the unacceptable
provisions.
D. The ProposedFinalTrade and Commerce Agreement
In early May, the negotiations produced what each side
hoped would be a final agreement. The proposed Final
Trade and Commerce Agreement was essentially the same
as the Interim Agreement, with some revisions that had
been suggested during the Haudenosaunee community
review process. Thousands of copies of this proposed Final
Trade and Commerce Agreement were printed by the
Haudenosaunee and were hand delivered to the mail boxes
of all of the Haudenosaunee territories. Nothing was secret

51. See id.
52. See Robert L. Smith, Governor Pulls Plug on Indian Tax Collections:
Standoffs End Stuns All Sides: A State Agreement With the Iroquois is
Suddenly Cancelled,POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), May 23, 1997, at Al.
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about this proposed Final Agreement. The Haudenosaunee
had carefully informed the state that the Final Agreement
had to be approved in each Haudenosaunee nation and then
by the Haudenosaunee Grand Council. The approval
procedure was in process when Governor Pataki unilaterally canceled the agreement."
Like the Interim Agreement, the proposed Final
Agreement contained the following major provisions: (1) the
sovereignty of the Haudenosaunee was recognized and reaffirmed by the state, (2) the state recognized the
eighteenth century treaties between the Haudenosaunee
and the United States government, (3) the state recognized
the traditional Haudenosaunee governments' right to
regulate trade and commerce on its territories, and (4) no
state taxes would be collected on sales of cigarettes at stores
on Haudenosaunee territories.54
The title of the proposed Final Agreement, "Trade and
Commerce Agreement with the State of New York," is significant because the state initially focused on obtaining a "tax
compact." The Haudenosaunee were successful in getting
the state to agree to a "Trade and Commerce Agreement."
This is significant because the agreement was not merely a
tax agreement. Rather the state agreed both that state
taxes would not be collected and that the Haudenosaunee
were a sovereign group who possessed right to regulate
trade and commerce on their territories.
The Preamble of the proposed Final Agreement demonstrates how the proposals are more that simple "tax
compacts."
In the spirit of the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, the Haudeno-

saunee and the State of New York do hereby enter into this
Agreement for their mutual benefit, in order to reaffirm and

further the mutual respect, peace and friendship that exists
between them, and to promote trade and commerce among our
people.
This Agreement affirms the sovereign status of the Haudeno-

saunee Nations ... and represents a binding commitment on the
part of the State of New York and these Nations of the
Haudenosaunee. Inherent in that commitment is a recognition by

53. See id.
54. See Trade and Commerce Agreement Between the Sate of New York and
the Haudenosauneeand the State ofNew York, supra note 47.
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the State of New York of the sovereign status of these
Haudenosaunee Nations to engage in trade and commerce within
their territories. This Agreement also recognizes the inherent
right of these Haudenosaunee Nations to regulate, monitor and
exercise control over trade and commerce within their
territories...
Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to constitute a waiver
of sovereign immunity .... In this Agreement, as in Article I of
the Canandaigua Treaty, the peace and friendship of the aforesaid
parties55 is firmly established, and shall be perpetual between
them.

The proposed Final Agreement also specified that no
state excise or sales taxes would be collected on any sales of
cigarettes in native stores on the territories of the
traditional Haudenosaunee.
III. RESPONSES OF CERTAIN NATIVE BuSINESs OWNERS TO
THE PROPOSED INTERIM AND FINAL TRADE AND
COMMERCE AGREEMENTS

A. The Necessity to Regulate and Control These Businesses
Given the clear strengthening of Haudenosaunee
sovereignty and the agreement not to collect state taxes, the
reader might wonder why these Trade and Commerce
Agreements were not universally accepted by all of the native business owners. I would submit that the reasons for
some of their negative reactions to the Agreements were at
least twofold. First, some native business owners refused to
recognize their own traditional governments' right to
regulate and control their businesses, and, second, some
native business owners wanted to continue to keep all of the
profits from these tax-free sales for themselves rather than
sharing them with their communities.
It is important to stress that these businesses were able
to reap millions of dollars in profits from tax-free sales.
Tax-free sales existed solely because of the sovereignty of
their nations. This national sovereignty prevented the
application of state jurisdiction and taxes to their bus55. See Trade and Commerce Agreement Between the Sate of New York and
the Haudenosauneeand the State of New York, supranote 47.
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inesses. However, I would argue that a common
misconception has developed among some native business
owners that they are individually sovereign and that no law
should apply to them or their businesses. This
misconception led to their position that they have a "right"
to operate any business they choose, without regulation or
control by their own native governments. Many of these
businesses have used their accumulated wealth to hire
attorneys and public relations firms to fight their own
traditional governments and to ignore the laws and customs
of their own nations.56
In the past five years, businesses from various native
territories around the state have formed organizational
structures to push their pro-business, anti-regulation
agenda. One organization repeatedly changed its name;
some of its titles have been the Native Business Association, the Iroquois Businessperson Association, the First
Nation Business League and the League of First Nations.
This last name, the League of First Nations, is an
indication that these business owners' agenda includes
governmental concerns. These organizations have consistently attracted the same business owners and used their
accumulated profits to fight their own native governments.
One of the clearest examples of the negative impact of
the misconception of individual sovereignty is the case of
Oliver Hill, a former Onondaga who ran an unlicensed
business on the Onondaga Nation from 1987 until the
Nation shut it down in 1993."7 At first, Hill had an oral
agreement with the Council of Chiefs which permitted him
to sell cigarettes as long as he agreed to pay the then very
low nation cigarette fee. The oral agreement was made in
1983, on the basis of a hand shake and Hill's promise. After
sporadically paying the fee, Hill stopped paying altogether
in 1988.58 Hill's most egregious actions occurred in the mid1980s, when he opened a gas station with no permission
56. See, e.g., Judge: State Can't Block Gas Tankers: The Shipments Were
Headed for the Seneca Nation: The State Plans to Appeal, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), May 16, 1997, at A4.
57. Patrick Lakamp & Brian Carr, DA Says Hunt Loan Broke Law if
$37,500 Isn't Repaid Monday Hunt Could Face Charges, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), Nov. 6, 1994, at Al; and Mark Weiner, Business Owners: Banishment Was Illegal They Say Onondaga Chiefs Violated Great Law of Iroquois,
PosT-STANDARD (Syracuse), June 19, 1994, at El.
58. Lakamp & Carr, supranote 57, at Al.
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from the Nation and in total violation of the Nation's Business Rules and Regulations. The Council became concerned
about the safety of Hill's underground gasoline storage
tanks and the piping which fed his gas pumps. Numerous
letters about the underground tanks were written to Hill
and his attorney by the Council and by myself, as the
Nation's attorney. The letters were all ignored. Hill's
refusal to keep his promise to pay the Nation's cigarette fee
and his refusal to account for his gasoline system resulted
in the April 1, 1993 decision by the people of Onondaga to
close Hill's illegal businesses. This closure, although
resisted physically and with court challenges by Hill, was
effectuated by the citizens of Onondaga through the
leadership of the Onondaga women.5 9
However, despite the closure, the physical infrastructure of Hill's businesses was left intact. In early
October of 1993, another Onondaga citizen across the road
from Hill's closed business while attempting to dig a well
was nearly overcome with gasoline fumes. This event led to
the discovery that Hill's underground gasoline storage and
piping system had leaked an estimated ten thousand
gallons of gasoline into the ground, thereby poisoning an
underground aquifer and three of his neighbors' wells. Hill
has not done anything to assist his former neighbors for his
poisoning of their wells.
The Hill situation is an example of the need for
governmental regulation and control of all businesses and
commerce on the Haudenosaunee nations. Unregulated
individual business owners have repeatedly proven that
their individual desire for profits have been given preference over any concern for the nation and its citizens.
One aspect of sovereignty is that a sovereign government has the right and the duty to regulate trade and
commerce, including activities such as Hill's. This duty is
owed to their citizens and to their non-native neighbors.
The nations are sovereign, given their aboriginal existence
as recognized by the eighteenth century treaties, and this
national sovereignty precludes the imposition of state
jurisdiction and taxes.'
59. Robert L. Smith, Blockaded Smoke Shop Burns. The Blaze Follows. An
Increase in Pressure Put on Merchants by Supporters of Traditional Chiefs,
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), June 8, 1994, at Al.
60. See, e.g., Treaty With the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22, 1784, 7
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B. The Responses of CertainNative Businesses to the Trade
and Commerce Agreements
1. Joseph "Smokin' Joe" Anderson. When the Interim
Trade and Commerce Agreement was implemented on April
1, 1997, it did not affect all of the native territories within
New York's borders. Since the elected Seneca government
at Cattaraugus and Allegany, and the elected Mohawk
government at Akwesasne are not members of the
Haudenosaunee confederacy, the Agreement did not protect
the native retailers on these territories. The elected Mohawk and Seneca governments did not reach any agreements with the state, and thereby left their stores unprotected from the state laws and regulations. Most of the
cigarette stores on the Tuscarora nation are owned either
directly or indirectly by Joseph "Smokin' Joe" Anderson,
who refuses to recognize the authority of the traditional
Tuscarora Council of Chiefs to regulate the businesses on
that territory.6
The state instituted a new era of enforcement to
support the Interim Agreement and began to seize shipments of cigarettes and motor fuel which were being
shipped to stores not covered by the Interim Agreement.
Unless Anderson agreed to regulation by the traditional
Tuscarora government and to pay the nation fee, which was
less than half of the state taxes, there was no longer a legal
supply of tax-exempt products available to Anderson's
stores. Given his strong opposition to his own native
government, Anderson rejected this regulation and, instead,
elected to fully pay all state taxes thereby insuring an
uninterrupted supply of product for his stores. This was not
the best business decision because it was more costly.
Therefore, it must be seen as a political decision.
Despite Anderson's full payment of state taxes, the Department of Taxation and Finance nevertheless seized some
shipments of gasoline destined for Anderson's stores. Two
Stat. 15; Treaty at Fort Harmar, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33; Treaty With the Six
Nations at Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794.
61. Agnes Palazzetti, Indian-Made Gasohol, Cigarettes at Issue, BUFF.
NEWS, May 1, 1997, at B1.
62. See Judge:State Can't Block Gas Tankers. The Shipments Were Headed
for the Seneca Nation. The State Plans to Appeal, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse),
May, 16, 1997, at A4.
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gasoline distributors filed an action on May 7, 1997 in New
York State Supreme Court by for the return of their seized
product.63 On May 15 1997, Anderson filed an affidavit is
support of the Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction, wherein he stated:
My businesses are licensed and registered by the Federal
Government to the extent required.... [M]y businesses annually
pay millions of dollars in federal excise, federal withholding taxes,
federal social security and Medicaid taxes, unemployment taxes,
workers' compensation taxes, and disability taxes.... After April
1, 1997, I ordered shipments of fully taxed (both state and federal)
motor fuel... for delivery to my businesses.-

On May 16, 1997, Supreme Court Justice Pigott granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the
Tax Department to return the seized shipments.
[The] Department of Taxation and Finance and the Commissioner
of Taxation of New York State, and their respective officers, agents
and employees, are preliminarily enjoined and restrained during
the pendency of this action from interdicting, seizing or otherwise
interfering with shipments or deliveries of motor fuel and diesel
Article 12-A excise
motor fuel upon which all applicable New York 65
been paid.
have
taxes
sales
28
Article
and
taxes

As a result of Justice Pigott's opinion, Anderson was
able to receive product even though he had to pay all state
taxes to do so. His blanket acceptance and payment of all
state taxes for his sales on Tuscarora territory was hardly
an act that strengthened the sovereignty of the Tuscarora
Nation. Rather, it was the opposite, a clear example of a
native business owner putting his continued business
operation and his personal profits before the interests of the
nation and its sovereign right to regulate trade and
commerce the territory. Rather than fight the state's attempt to impose its jurisdiction and taxes on sovereign
Tuscarora territory, Anderson elected to fight the interests
of his own traditional government.
2. Seneca Hawk and Triple J's. The elected Seneca
63. See Jimerson v. Urbach, No. 1997/4015 (Erie Co. Sup. Ct. 1997)
64. See Affidavit of Joseph M. Anderson, Jimerson v. Urbach, No. 1997/4015
(Erie Co. Sup. Ct. May 15, 1997).
65. See Justice Pigott's May 16, 1997 Order.
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government at Cattaraugus and Allegany decided not to
make an opting out agreement with the state. Many
traditional Haudenosaunee are of the opinion that this
decision was dictated by the tribal council, which was
dominated by business owners and their supporters. Due to
the failure to reach such an agreement, there was no longer
a legal supply of untaxed product for the stores on these
territories by April 1, 1997.
On April 4, 1997 peace officers employed by the Tax
Department stopped and seized a tractor and tanker trailer
with 8506 gallons of unleaded motor fuel destined for Triple
J's, a gasoline retailer on the Cattaraugus territory of the
Seneca Nation.66 Allegedly, the truck's driver was not
carrying the state required manifest because the state taxes
had not been paid on the product.
Two days later, a second tanker with 8538 gallons of
unleaded motor fuel, destined for Seneca Hawk, another
gasoline retailer on the Cattaraugus territory, was stopped
and seized." Pursuant to Tax Law § 1848, the Tax
Department moved in New York Supreme Court to confirm
these seizures. This action was opposed by Triple J's,
Seneca Hawk, the drivers of the trucks and the distributor.
On May 14, 1997, Supreme Court Justice Sconiers
denied the Tax Department's action for confirmation and
ruled that the motor fuel seizures amounted to unequal,
selective and unjust enforcement of laws, in violation of the
equal protection clause." Justice Sconiers further ruled that
the Interim Agreements were "found to be an unlawful
usurpation [sic] of legislative power, illegal and
unenforceable."69 The ruling was surprising since not all of
the parties to the Interim Agreement were before the Court.
The legal impact of Justice Sconiers' decision was relatively short-lived because the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department agreed to hear the appeal on an expedited basis. On July 25, 1997 the Fourth Department resoundingly
reversed Judge Sconiers. 6 The Fourth Department ruled
66. Tax Law Seizure to Enforce Tax Law on Reservation Upheld, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 8, 1997, at 25.
67. New York Dep't of Tax. & Fin. v. Bramhall, 667 N.Y.S.2d 141, 145 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997).
68. New York Dep't of Tax. & Fin. v. Bramhall, 660 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup. Ct.
1997)
69. Id. at 333.
70. See Bramhall,667 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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that the seizures were perfectly legal and should have been
confirmed by the Supreme Court 7' and that there had been
no selective enforcement.72 The Appellate Division clearly
ruled that the Interim Agreements were valid:
The court further erred in finding that the interim agreements
reached between the Department and certain Indian Nations and
tribes constitute "an unlawful usurpation [sic] of legislative power"
and that the agreements are illegal and unenforceable. No respondent raised that issue,... the Indian Nations and tribes that
entered into those interim agreements were not parties to the
motions to confirm and the Department was deprived of the
opportunity to respond. Under the circumstances, it was improper
73
for the court to grant that sweeping relief.

The most damaging aspect of this litigation from the
perspective of native sovereignty was the clear ruling by the
Fourth Department that the Seneca Nation sovereignty did
not preclude the state's taxation of these sales.
Further, the sovereign rights of the Seneca Nation do not prohibit
application of the State's tax laws to sales on the Seneca Nation's
reservations to non-Indians ....
State taxation of sales of
cigarettes and other products to non-Indians on reservations and
other taxes directed toward the activity of non-Indians on
reservations have
been sustained notwithstanding Indian claims
74
of sovereignty.

Given the Attea decision, this ruling was not
unexpected.75
The short-term gain of individual native stores was
traded against the long term loss of national sovereignty,
with the anti-sovereignty ruling by the Fourth Department,
whose geographic jurisdiction covers five of the six Nations
of the Haudenosaunee. It is clear to see that these legal
challenges to these seizures by Triple J's and Seneca Hawk
was done solely to keep their businesses operating on the
short run, while the long term result was a severe blow to
the sovereignty of all native Nations within New York's
borders.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 145.
See id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text discussing Attea.
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CONCLUSION

The record of the events during the first six months of
1997 clearly outlines the three courses of action selected to
fight the imposition of New York law over the Haudenosaunee Nations. The Haudenosaunee's approach of
employing diplomatic, government-to-government negotiations resulted in the state's renewed recognition of the
sovereignty of the Haudenosaunee and agreements that it
would not collect taxes from the Haudenosaunee.
Smokin' Joe Anderson's approach was payment of all
state taxes, which undermined his own traditional government by effectively saying that it lacked the right to
regulate his businesses. Anderson also agreed that state
jurisdiction and taxes were valid on sovereign Tuscarora
territory. This was a victory for his pocketbook and a defeat
for national sovereignty.
Finally, Triple J's and Seneca Hawk's court fight
resulted in a confirmation of the state's jurisdiction and
taxation authority on native territory and a direct rejection
of the Seneca Nation's sovereignty by the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department.
In light of the result achieved by the approach adopted
by Anderson, Triple J's and Seneca Hawk's, it is clear that
the Haudenosaunee's diplomatic, government-to-government tactics are the best method to preserve native
sovereignty and maintain tax-exempt status for native
retailers.

